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BUSINESS AS USUAL: JUVENILE JUSTICE
DURING THE 1980s
IRA M. SCHWARTZ*
MARTHA WADE STEKETEE**
JEFFREY A. Burrs***
INTRODUCTION'
The juvenile justice system during the 1980s failed to live
up to the goals it set for itself during the 1960s and 1970s. The
U.S. Congress, Presidential commissions and numerous stan-
dard-setting bodies determined during the 1970s that the most
effective means of protecting the public safety and reducing the
impact ofjuvenile crime would involve prevention and commu-
nity-based intervention, with minimal institutionalization. The
overwhelming consensus was to reserve training schools and
other secure facilities for chronic or violent offenders. Very
young and less serious offenders were to be supervised in non-
institutional and community-based programs.
Despite this consensus, national rates ofjuvenile incarcera-
tion remained virtually unchanged during the past decade. By
the end of the 1980s, in fact, many states used incarceration
more and often for less serious offenders. The glaring
problems of gang violence, drug abuse, and automatic weapons
captured the headlines, yet the nation as a whole was not
experiencing a juvenile crime wave. The inner-cities became
more isolated and more neglected during the 1980s, and a
Director, Center for the Study of Youth Policy at the University of
Michigan and Professor, University of Michigan School of Social Work. He
was the Administrator of the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention during the Carter Administration.
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1. Some of the data utilized in this article were made available by the
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Data for the
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highly organized criminal subculture emerged in response to
the lucrative cocaine market. In many jurisdictions, the
urgency of these problems was used to justify the abandonment
of community-based corrections programs. The political will
to provide prevention and early treatment seemed to erode.
PLANS FOR REFORM
The origins of American practices in youth detention and
corrections can be traced to the "houses of refuge" of the mid-
1800s and the child saver movement which emerged in the U.S.
toward the end of the nineteenth century.' Public outrage over
the incarceration of young people in adult jails and prisons
gave rise to the belief that juveniles should be placed in sepa-
rate institutions that emphasize rehabilitation and reform. 3
The houses of refuge, forerunners of contemporary juvenile
training schools, "promised judges, juries, police, and dis-
gusted or overwhelmed parents an alternative to committing
children to local jails or prisons."4 Pre-adjudication detention
centers were developed much later, following the birth of the
juvenile court. Many of these centers served dependent and
neglected children as well as those accused of crimes.
These juvenile institutions largely escaped public scrutiny
until the 1960s and 1970s when class action lawsuits began to
reveal abusive practices and intolerable conditions of confine-
ment in training schools.5 Influential books further docu-
mented the plight of children in these facilities.6 A five-year
examination of the juvenile justice system by the United States
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to investigate Juvenile Delin-
quency resulted in the enactment of the landmark Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. 7 A number of
2. See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1188-1221 (1970).
3. See S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT 57-62
(1977).
4. Id. at 24.
5. See, e.g., Harris v. Bell, 402 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Inmates of
Boys' Training School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Lollis v.
New York State Dept. of Soc. Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 355
F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972) aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); Pena v. New York State Department of Social Services,
322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6. K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S
INCARCERATED CHILDREN (1976); H. JAMES, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE: A
NATIONAL SCANDAL (1970).
7. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L.
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presidentially-appointed commissions and national profes-
sional standard-setting organizations also issued reports and
promulgated various sets of standards designed to upgrade the
juvenile justice system.
The impact of these developments was felt throughout the
juvenile justice system. One outcome was a major reconceptu-
alization of the role and purpose of pre- and post-adjudication
incarceration ofjuveniles. A consensus of professional opinion
emerged that pre-adjudication detention should be reserved
for youths who (1). present a clear and substantial threat to the
community, or (2) would likely abscond or fail to appear in
court if released on their own recognizance or under some
form of community-based supervision. Standards published in
1980 by the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (NACJJDP) recommended that:
Juveniles subject to the jurisdiction of the family court
over delinquency should not be detained in a secure facil-
ity unless:
a. They are fugitives from another jurisdiction;
b. They request protection in writing in circum-
stances that present an immediate threat of seri-
ous physical injury;
c. They are charged with murder in the first or sec-
ond degree;
d. They are charged with a serious property crime
or a crime of violence other than first or second
.degree murder which if committed by an adult
would be a felony, and
i. They are already detained or on conditional
release in connection with another delin-
quency proceeding;
ii. They have a demonstrable recent record of
willful failures to appear at family court
proceedings;
iii. They have a demonstrable recent record of
violent conduct resulting in physical injury
to others; or
iv. They have (a) demonstrable recent record
of adjudications for serious property
offenses; and
v. There is no less restrictive alternative that
will reduce risk of flight, or of serious harm
No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C., beginning at § 5601).
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to property or to the physical safety of the
juvenile or others.8
A consensus also held that training schools should be
reserved for serious violent and chronic juvenile offenders.
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,
for example, provided fiscal incentives for states to deinstitu-
tionalize status offenders (runaways, school truants, youths in
conflict with their parents, etc.),' to eliminate the jailing of
juveniles in adult facilities,' 0 and to develop community-based
alternatives for non-violent and non-chronic delinquent
youths," as defined by the statute. 2 The authors of the Act
recognized that training schools were an important part of the
continuum of services in youth corrections, but they believed
that these institutions should be used for the incarceration of
violent and chronic juvenile law violators.'
The juvenile justice standards promulgated by the Insti-
tute for Judicial Administration/American Bar Association rec-
ommended that "[in choosing among statutorily permissible
options, the court should employ the least restrictive category
and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the serious-
ness of the offense, as modified by the degree of culpability
indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, and by
the age and prior record of the juvenile."' 4 These standards
stated a clear preference to maintain a juvenile at home when-
ever possible. "Removal from home is the most severe disposi-
tion authorized for adjudicated juveniles. As such, it should be
reserved for the most serious or repetitive offenses, and rarely,
if ever, used for younger juveniles."'"
The IJA/ABA standards also encouraged state and local
youth corrections agencies to develop alternatives to institu-
tions that could be used as dispositional options by the juvenile
courts. 16 In a similar vein, the NACJJDP standards recom-
mended that training schools be used as a dispositional "last
8. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMrIrEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS 297 (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS].
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
10. Id. § 5633(a)(14).
11. Id. § 5633(a)(12)(B).
12. I § 5603(1).
13. Ford Administration Stifles Juvenile Justice Program: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4 (1975).
14. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSmONS 34 (1980).
15. Id. at 62.
16. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR
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resort. '"7 These standards encouraged courts to select the
"least restrictive" dispositional option "consistent with the
seriousness of the offense, the juvenile's role in that offense,
and the juvenile's age and prior record."'"
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals issued a report recommending
that states adopt youth correctional policies similar to those
then being implemented in Massachusetts.' 9 Massachusetts
restricts the use of secure institutional treatment to cases in
'which a youth needs to be confined for purposes of public pro-
tection and cannot be managed in a less secure setting without
compromising public safety.2 °
By the late 1970s, it seemed that a major shift in juvenile
justice policy was in the offing. There was growing support for
removing non-chronic and non-violent juveniles from deten-
tion centers and training schools by expanding the diversity
and availability of community-based options. Increasing num-
bers of state administrators and policymakers were becoming
aware of the need for a range of sanctions and services in youth
corrections. From all indications, the 1980s promised to be a
decade of reform in juvenile justice.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1980s
The best available evidence now suggests that there was
little change during the 1980s in the nation's youth detention
and correctional policies. In fact, some states actually
regressed, becoming more punitive and more institutionally
oriented. In part, this mirrored developments in adult correc-
tions and criminal justice as a whole: both the prison popula-
tion and the incarceration rate reached all-time highs during
the 1980s. 2 I According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
number of Americans under some type of correctional supervi-
sion increased by 30% between 1983 and 1986.2 The Bureau
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION 159
(1980).
17. STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 377 (1980).
18. Id. at 297.
19. NAT'L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME (1973).
20. See generally B. KRISBERG, J. AUSTIN & P. STEELE, UNLOCKING
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF YoUtH
SERVICES (1989).
21. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME
AND JUSTICE 104 (2d ed. 1988).
22. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at A21, col. 4.
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of the Census reported that the number of corrections employ-
ees at local, state and federal levels grew by 10% in 1987 alone,
making corrections the fastest growing sector of government
employment.23
It is disturbing to find that the juvenile system followed the
direction' set by adult corrections. Juvenile justice policy dur-
ing the 1980s became more concerned with social control and
punishment than with its historic mission of prevention and
rehabilitation. Besieged by political pressure to do something
about juvenile crime, elected public officials responded by
enacting more punitive measures. In many jurisdictions, they
adopted the cynical, throw-away-the-key attitude that some-
times characterizes the adult correctional system. As is fre-
quently the case with criminal justice issues, rising public
attention to juvenile crime resulted in actions which were
highly visible though not necessarily effective.
Policymakers in every level of government know that it is
popular -to call for a "tough" response to crime. Unless the
political environment allows public officials to say otherwise,
being tough is inevitably translated as increased reliance upon
incarceration, longer sentences, and prosecuting more
juveniles in the adult criminal courts. Even though popular
perceptions of rising juvenile crime rates have been contra-
dicted frequently by official statistics which show stable, or even
declining rates, 24 and despite the fact that juvenile incarcera-
tion rates seem to vary more by political boundaries than by the
incidence of crime,25 the juvenile justice system inevitably
responds to outside pressure by increasing the use of
incarceration.
Elected officials who advocate tougher sentencing laws and
more punitive approaches toward juvenile law violators often
believe they are responding to the demands of the public, par-
ticularly their own constituents. Surveys, however, indicate
that the public has a distorted picture of the juvenile crime
problem. A national public opinion survey conducted in 1982
revealed that 87% of the respondents believed that serious
juvenile crime was increasing at an alarming rate.2" Yet
23. Government Workers at Record 17Million, L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at
2, col. 4.
24. See generally Galvin & Polk,JuvenileJustice: Time for New Direction?, 29
CRIME & DELINQ. 325 (1983); Cook & Laub, The (Surprising) Stability of Youth
Crime Rates, 2 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 265 (1986).
25. See generally Krisberg, Litsky & Schwartz, Youth in Confinement: Justice
by Geography, 21J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.. 153 (1984).
26. I. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JusTIcE FOR JUVENILES 26 (1989).
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national arrest rates for Part I offenses by juveniles were rela-
tively stable between 1975 and 1987.27 A recent California sur-
vey found that more than 80% of adults in that state believed
that the rate of juvenile crime had been increasing during the
1980s.2 s In reality, the total juvenile arrest rate had fallen by
8.1% between 1981 and 1986, while the rate for violent felo-
nies fell 21.4%.29
The results from the California survey are particularly
interesting because they raise questions about whether the
-actions of politicians really reflect the thinking of the electo-
rate. The California respondents expressed "a strong prefer-
ence for sentencing juveniles to specialized treatment and
counseling programs in lieu of incarceration in state correc-
tional facilities, even for repeat serious offenders." s° They
expressed only moderate support for spending tax dollars to
relieve overcrowding in California's youth correction facilities
and "strong support for the proposition that juvenile offenders
should be separated from adults in confinement, and for ajuve-
nile sentencing scheme different from that of adults. '"
There remains among the public a general consensus that
juvenile offenders should be treated. specially by the criminal
justice system. We are still likely to attribute juvenile crime to
frustrated economic opportunity and unemployment; we
expect the juvenile court to rehabilitate rather than simply to
punish; and we expect minor offenses to be handled outside of
the juvenile justice system-preferably by community agen-
cies.3 2 The strain between these long-held values and the pop-
ularity of hard-line, get-tough rhetoric produces acute
demands upon the agencies comprising the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Juvenile courts are derided for being too lenient onjuve-
nile offenders, but simultaneously criticized for exacerbating
the problems of troubled youths by breaking up families and
placing young offenders in correctional institutions that do not
"correct."
27. Idat 31; STEKETEE, WILLIS & SCHWARTZ, JUVENILE JUSTICE TRENDS:
1977-1987 17 (1989).
28. Steinhart, California Opinion Poll. Public Attitudes on Youth Crime,
NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ. Focus, Dec. 1988, at 7.
29. Id. at 6-7.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Galvin & Polk, supra note 24, at 330.
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JUVENILE CORRECTIONS AND DETENTION
Apparently in response to these pressures, many states
increased their rates of juvenile institutionalization during the
1980s; others at least maintained their rates of confinement. In
very few states, however, did significant changes or reform
result from the federal policies, class action lawsuits, and tight-
ened professional standards of the 1970s and early 1980s.
Table 1, for example, indicates that national rates of admis-
sions to detention centers were slightly higher in 1986 than in
1977. According to these data from the federal government's
Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 3 the total
admission rate to public detention centers declined from 1,681
admissions per 100,000 eligible youth population in 1977, to
1,488 per 100,000 in 1982. At the time of most recent avail-
able census (1986-87), the rate had climbed back to nearly
1,800 admissions per 100,000.
In addition, there was a large increase in the rates of com-
mitment to these facilities. Although not designed or recom-
mended for the housing of committed youths, admissions of
committed juveniles to detention centers increased from 16 to
96 per 100,000 between 1977 and 1986-a surge of 600%.
Such an increase underscores the growing concern that deten-
tion facilities are used inappropriately by the courts as a dispo-
sitional option for adjudicated juveniles.34
Table 2 demonstrates that training school admission rates
were also relatively unchanged between 1977 and 1986. As
was the case with detention centers, the total rate of admissions
to training schools declined from 227 to 205 per 100,000
between 1977 and 1982, but grew to 236 by 1986. This table
shows that admissions for female juveniles increased much less
between 1982 and 1986. Male admissions, on the other hand,
climbed by 17% during that period-from 345 to 403 per
100,000 eligible youth population. The rates for commitment
33. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility
Census, 1977 and 1982-83 [computer files]. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
[producer and distributor]. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Detention and Correctional
Facility Census, 1986-87: Public Facilities (computer file]. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1988
[producer]. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research, 1988 (distributor].
34. See generally Schwartz, Fishman, Hatfield, Krisberg & Eisikovits,
Juvenile Detention: The Hidden Closets Revisited, 4 JUsT. Q. 219 (1987).
BUSINESS AS USUAL
TABLE 1
U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS ADMISSIONS AND
RATES PER 100,000 ELIGIBLE YOUTHS BY
STATUS 1977, 1982 AND 1986
1977 1982 1986
Rate per Rate per Rate per
# 100,000 # 100,000 # 100,000
Committed Youths
Males 3,806 26 16,940 120 21,039 159
Females 998 7 3,444 25 3,844 30
Total 4,804 16 20,384 74 24,883 96
Detained Youths
Males 371,694 2,502 308,457 2,190 353,411 2,664
Females 112,738 790 81,717 604 89,329 702
Total 484,432 1,663 390,174 1,414 442,740 1,703
All Youths
Males 375,728 2,530 325,461 2,311 374,461 2,823
Females 113,966 798 85,227 630 93,207 732
Total 489,694 1,681 410,688 1,488 467,668 1,799
Notes:
I. Rates are based on the numbers of youths aged 10 through the age of maximum
original juvenile court jurisdiction for each state and the District of Columbia.
2. Committed status youths are those placed following adjudication. Detained
youths are pending adjudication or awaiting formal court disposition or placement.
Voluntary status admissions (self-admits or referrals through agencies other than the
juvenile court) are included in the "all youths" lines above.
Sources: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1977, 1982-83 and
1986-87. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
published and unpublished data.
admissions only (i.e., excluding detainees) were essentially.
stable.
A substantial proportion of the juveniles confined in
detention centers and training schools were minor and petty
law violators and, to a lesser extent, status offenders. Table 3
shows the number of juveniles confined in public detention
centers on the day of the most recently published facility cen-
sus (February 2, 1987), as well as the offenses charged against
these youths. This table reveals that only 41 7 of the detained
youths were accused of committing a Part I offense (either vio-
lent or property). Approximately 6% of the youths had been
detained for a status offense, while more than half were
charged with less serious Part II crimes such as shoplifting,
drug offenses, vandalism and receiving stolen property. The
data also reveal significant differences by gender. Just 22% of
detained females were accused of a Part I offense.
19911
386 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol..5
TABLE 2
U.S. PUBLIC TRAINING SCHOOLS ADMISSIONS AND
RATES PER 100,000 ELIGIBLE YOUTHS BY
STATUS 1977, 1982 AND 1986
1977 1982 1986
Rate per Rate per Rate per
# 100,000 # 100.000 # 100,000
Committed Youths
Males 48,903 329 41,888 297 43,988 332
Females 7,417 52 6,448 48 6,091 48
Total 56,320 193 48,336 175 50,079 193
Detained Youths
Males 7,494 50 6.746 48 9,478 71
Females 2,201 15 1,481 11 1,842 14
Total 9,695 33 8,227 30 11,320 44
All Youths
Males 56,427 380 48,639 345 53,466 403
Females 9,671 68 7,929 59 7,933 62
Total 66,098 227 56,568 205 61,399 236
Notes:
1. Rates are based on the numbers of youths aged 10 through the age of maximum
original juvenile court jurisdiction for each state and the District of Columbia.
2. Committed status youths are those placed following adjudication. Detained
youths are pending adjudication or awaiting formal court disposition or placement.
Voluntary status admissions (self-admits or referrals through agencies other than the
juvenile court) are included in the "all youths" lines above.
Sources: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1977, 1982-83 and
1986-87. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
published and unpublished data.
Table 4 depicts the offenses charged against youths who
were confined in public training schools at the time of the most
recent census. Slightly more than half (53.6%) of these
juveniles were accused of serious offenses. One-fifth had been
adjudicated for a Part I violent crime, while one-third were
charged with a serious property offense such as burglary or
auto theft. Again, there were significant differences by gender,
with two-thirds of the females being incarcerated for less seri-
ous (non-Part I) crimes.
Table 5 provides the percentage in each state of confined
youths that committed a Part I offense. As reported by admin-
istrators in the 1986-87 census, these percentages vary substan-
tially from state to state. State public training school facilities
in Wisconsin, Washington, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania
reported that more than 70% of their youth populations had
been charged with Part I offenses. In other states, however, the
proportion of Part I offenders can be quite low, suggesting that
BUSINESS AS USUAL
TABLE 3
U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS ONE DAY CouNTs
BY OFFENSE AND GENDER 1987
MALES FEMALES TOTAL
# % # % # 5
Part I: Violent 1,691 13.5% 116 4.9% 1,807 12.1%
Part 1: Property 3,959 31.6% 409 17.4% 4,368 29.3%
Part I! 6,474 51.6% 1,415 60.0% 7.889 53.0%
Status 416 3.3% 417 17.7% 833 5.6%
Totals 12,540 .100.0% 2,357 100.0% 14,897 100.0%
Notes:
1. Respondent administrators were asked to indicate the number of committed and
detained juvenile and status offenders on the census date February 2, 1987. They were
directed to report the most serious offense if records reflect several offenses.
2. Offense categories are collapsed here as presented in the Survey:
Part I Violent: Murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
Part I Property: Burglary, arson, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft.
Part II: All offenses not Part I or Status.
Status: Offense which "would not be considered a crime if committed by an adult"
Source: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1986-87.
many non-serious offenders were being confined in correc-
tional institutions. For example, Maine, Montana, North and
South Dakota, Virginia and Kentucky all reported that 30% or
less of the youths confined in their training schools committed
serious, Part I offenses."3
State Studies
The federally-administered Juvenile Detention and Cor-
rectional Facility Census, which provided most of the data
presented above, is a useful and internally consistent source of
data on the national juvenile corrections population. It is espe-
cially valuable as a device for tracking changes in the rates of
facility admissions and periodic one-day counts. It cannot,
however, be taken as a completely reliable measure of the
severity of offenses charged against the incarcerated juvenile
population.
35. These tables describe only those youths for whom offenses were
reported. Vermont did not have a public training school; Wyoming had a
large number of cases in which no offense was reported. Overall, offenses
were reported for more than 95% of youths present in public training schools
on the census date.
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TABLE 4
U.S. PUBLIC TRAINING SCHOOLS ONE DAY COUNTS
BY OFFENSE AND GENDER 1987
MALES FEMALES TOTAL
# % # %70
Part I: Violent 4,850 21.1% 354 12.8% 5,204 20.2%
Part I: Property 8,044 35.0% 565 20.5% 8,609 33.4%
Part II 9,857 42.8% 1,538 55.8% 11,395 44.2%
Status 260 1.1% 300 10.9% 560 2.2%
Totals 23,011 100.0% 2,757 100.0% 25,768 100.0%
Notes:
1. Respondent administrators were asked to indicate the numbers and types of
committed and detained juvenile and status offenders on the census date February 2,
1987. They were directed to report the most serious offense if records reflect several
offenses.
2. Offense categories are collapsed here as presented in the Survey:
Part I Violent: Murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
Part I Property: Burglary, arson, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft.
Part II: All offenses not Part I or Status.
Status: Offense which "would not be considered a crime if committed by an adult"
Source: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1986-87.
The Census, which is better known as the Children in Cus-
tody series, relies upon questionnaires filled out by administra-
tors. Each administrator answers a number of questions about
the youths being held in his or her facility. The questionnaire
asks the administrators to report the most serious offenses
charged against the youths who were in custody on the census
date. The youths' case records or legal files are not reviewed in
detail by anyone outside of the facilities. The most accurate
characterization of the offenses committed by incarcerated
juveniles would require reviews of the documents typically
found in delinquency case records.
Recently, a number of states conducted risk assessment
studies that offer an additional source of information about
juvenile corrections populations. Independent researchers
examined institutional case records in the states and evaluated
the recentness, severity, and frequency of delinquent behavior
among incarcerated juvenile offenders. Through these studies,
the offender population of each juvenile correctional system
was segmented into relatively low-risk and relatively high-risk
groups so that policymakers and youth correction officials
could make informed decisions about how the system's limited
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resources were being allocated. These studies confirmed that a
relatively large proportion of the juveniles confined in state
training schools are not serious or chronic offenders. Further-
more, the studies suggest that the Facility Census may actually
underestimate the extent to which non-serious offenders are
incarcerated in training schools.
TABLE 5
U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS AND TRAINING
SCHOOLS PERCENT JUVENILES
INCARCERATED FOR PART I
OFFENSES By STATE AND TOTAL 1987
% Detention Center
Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense
% Training School
Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
46.9%
36.1%
26.2%
73.3%
41.0%
41.3%
60.0%
68.2%
20.6%
45.6%
47.9%
15.7%
62.5%
44.0%
27.9%
66.7%
47.3%
39.0%
55.1%
0.0%
32.2%
57.8%
44.9%
36.2%
42.9%
37.5%
0.0%
27.9%
17.1%
64.3%
46.2%
21.8%
44.7%
43.7%
25.0%
43.4%
47.4%
61.1%
63.9%
45.9%
68.6%
48.9%
36.8%
45.1%
53.4%
54.1%
66.7%
69.4%
58.2%
43.5%
39.0%
59.3%
30.4%
67.4%
23.8%
41.4%
53.3%
66.4%
46.9%
63.9%
38.9%
25.1%
34.8%
34.2%
73.7%
58.1%
51.0%
68.4%
41.5%
23.1%
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Table 5 (Continued)
% Detention Center % Training School
Population Incarcerated Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense for Part I Offense
Ohio 29.8% 61.1%
Oklahoma 48.8% 68.0%
Oregon 18.1% 65.6%
Pennsylvania 57.0% 70.1%
Rhode Island 0.0% 64.6%
South Carolina 66.7% 46.0%
South Dakota 15.2% 27.4%
Tennessee 49.3% 52.1%
Texas 49.1% 60.7%
Utah 12.6% 60.4%
Vermont 93.3% 0.0%
Virginia 43.3% 27.4%
Washington 53.0% 71.5%
West Virginia 66.7% 60.4%
Wisconsin 15.6% 84.7%
Wyoming 0.0% 2.2%
TOTAL U.S. 4 1.5% 53.6%
Notes:
1. Respondent administrators were asked to indicate the nubmer of committed and
detained juvenile and status offenders on the census date Februray 2, 1987.
Respondents indicate the most serious offense if record of several offenses.
2. These data reflect only those youth for whom offenses were reported. For
detention centers there were 202 females (or 7.9% of total females), 1,047 males (or
7.7% of total males) and 1,249 total juveniles (or 7.7% of total juveniles) for whom
offenses were not reported.
For training schools there were 202 females (or 6.8% of total females), 1,064 males
(or 4.4% of total males) and 1,266 total juveniles (or 4.7% of total juveniles) for whom
offenses were not reported.
3. Part I offenses include both Part I Property (burglary, arson, larceny-theft, and
motor vehicle theft) and Part I Violent (murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery and aggravated assault).
Source: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1986-87.
For example, a study of the Alabama youth correction sys-
tem revealed that nearly three-quarters (74%) of the state's
juvenile inmates were committed for status offenses, violations
of probation, misdemeanors, or minor felonies (primarily third
degree burglary and second degree theft). Most of the youths
committed for minor offenses had only minor prior offenses as
well. The researchers who conducted the study estimated that
Alabama's juvenile training school population could be
reduced by 50 to 55%o without a significant risk to the public
safety.3 6 Similar studies in Delaware, Rhode Island, and Missis-
sippi estimated that between 40 and 70% of the juveniles being
36. P. DEMURO & J. Burrs, AT THE CROSSROADS: A POPULATION
PROFILE OF YOUTHS COMMITTED TO THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH
SERVICES 30 (1989).
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held in secure facilities were neither violent nor chronic offend-
ers, and could most likely be managed safely in the
community.37
Juveniles in Jails
Despite amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act mandating
the removal of youths from adult jails,3 8 young people still are
being held in adult correctional facilities. Censuses and sample
surveys of jails throughout the 1980s by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics indicated that juveniles were confined in these facili-
ties. The 1983 census found 1,736 youths under 18 being held
in adult jails on June 30, 1983, with similar numbers reported
for both 1985 and 1986. 3' Though the Bureau ofJustice Statis-
tics indicates that such numbers must be interpreted with cau-
tion as they comprise fewer than 1 of the incarcerated
populations on these dates,40 it remains true that youths con-
tinue to be incarcerated in facilities designed for adults, con-
trary to federal law.
POLICY FOR THE 1990s
Despite the clear intent of the amended Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 and the standards and
goals advocated by the Institute for Judicial Administration/
American Bar Association, and the National Advisory Commit-
tee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, there were
few changes in the rate of juvenile incarceration during the
1980s. Some youths were still being held in adultjails, and rel-
atively minor and non-serious offenders were being placed in
secure facilities, including a number of status offenders. It was
apparent by the end of the decade that the reforms envisioned
by federal policymakers had not materialized. Yet, innovative
policymakers and juvenile justice professionals in some states
were beginning to re-emphasize community-based youth cor-
rections. Prompted at least in part by revenue constraints and
37. See P. DEMURO & B. KRISBERG, ADJUDICATED YoUTH IN DELAWARE
WHO NEED SECURE CARE 13 (1987); P. DEMURO &J. BUTrrs, REPORT TO THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE TASK FORCE: RHODE ISLAND'S JUVENILE JusTICE SYSTEM-
MORE OF THE SAME .. . OR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM? 4 (1988);J. BUTrrs
& P. DEMURO, POPULATION PROFILE AND RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY: MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF YOuTH SERVICES 19 (1989).
38. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509, 94 Stat.
2750, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(14)).
39. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1989).
40. Id.
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class action lawsuits,4 ' several states had reduced their training
school populations and were -exploring new correctional
approaches that rely on community supervision while reserving
secure placement for chronic and violent youthful offenders."
Massachusetts and Utah, for example, are widely recog-
nized for their reliance on community-based programs and
limited use of confinement for committed youths. Relatively
few juveniles in these two states are prosecuted in the adult
criminal courts and sentenced to adult prisons. Their youth
corrections systems have been studied by the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD). Recently, NCCD con-
cluded that "Utah's policy of community-based corrections did
not worsen public safety." 43 The NCCD researchers observed
that "the imposition of appropriate community-based controls
on highly active serious and chronic juvenile offenders is
consistent with public protection goals."" The study also
noted that managing these youthful offenders in the commu-
nity had saved Utah taxpayers more than $30 million in capital
costs and approximately $10 million annually in operating
expenditures.4 5
NCCD's evaluation of the youth corrections system in Mas-
sachusetts found that youths placed in the custody of the state
committed far fewer offenses after leaving state care and that
"there was a slight tendency over time to commit less serious
crimes." 46 The NCCD study also compared the recidivism
rates of youths in the Massachusetts system with those in the
states of Pennsylvania, Utah, Florida, Texas, Illinois, Wiscon-
sin, and California. The results showed that the youths in the
Massachusetts system "had equivalent, and in some instances
lower recidivism rates than youths from [the] other states."'47
Citing Utah's experience with community-based corrections,
the NCCD researchers believed that expanding the use of
secure confinement in Massachusetts would involve large pub-
41. See cases cited supra note 5.
42. See generally Blackmore, Brown & Krisberg, Juvenile Justice Reform:
The Bellwether States (1988); Butts, Youth Corrections in Maryland: The Dawning of
a New Era, in YOUTH CORRECTION REFORM: THE MARYLAND AND FLORIDA
EXPERIENCE (Ctr. for the Study of Youth Policy ed. 1988).
43. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, THE IMPACT OF
JUVENILE COURT INTERVENTION 147 (1987).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 134-36.
46. B. KRISBERG, J. AUSTIN & P. STEELE, supra note 20, at 18.
47. Id at 25.
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lic expenditures, but "would not produce a noticeable reduc-
tion in youth crime."1
48
A recent study in Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan tested
the effectiveness of intensive community-based supervision
programs as an alternative to commitment. The study had a
randomized design and followed more than 500 cases over a
four-year period. The results showed that the recidivism of
youths placed in the intensive probation programs was no
worse than that of youths committed to the state and usually
placed in public and private training schools.49 Moreover, the
intensive probation programs cost about one-third as much as
commitment and incarceration. The study estimated that the
State of Michigan saved nearly $9 million in placement costs by
using community programs instead of commitment.
Policymakers and juvenile justice officials who equate
being "tough" with good policy would thus be well advised to
re-evaluate their juvenile crime control practices. Institutional
confinement is but one resource in the battle to control juve-
nile crime, and should be focused on serious and violent
offenders in order to permit adequate financing of quality com-
munity-based programs. This strategy, which has been imple-
mented successfully in Massachusetts, Utah, and Maryland,' is
neither new nor radical. It is the sound, cost-effective approach
called for throughout the 1970s but never consistently imple-
mented before being abandoned in favor of "getting tough."
CRITICAL ISSUES
The need for reforms in youth detention and correctional
practices will be studied and debated by researchers, juvenile
justice professionals, and policymakers in the years ahead.
Those involved in shaping the policies of the next decade
should consider a number of important issues in planning for
the future.
48. Id. at 33.
49. See Barton & Butts, Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programs for
Juvenile Delinquents, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 238, 244 (1990).
50. See generally Loughran, Juvenile Corrections: The Massachusetts
Experience, in REINVESTING YOUTH CORRECTIONS RESOURCES: A TALE OF
THREE STATES 7 (1987); Van Vleet, Rutherford & Schwartz, Reinvesting Youth
Corrections Resources in Utah, in id. at 23; Butts, supra note 42; Matheson,
Political Leadership in Juvenile Justice Reform, in YOUTH CORRECTIONS AND THE
QUIET REVOLUTION 7 (n.d.); Bangerter, Youth Corrections in Utah: A Commitment
to Excellence, in id at 17.
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Race
The U.S. is becoming an increasingly diverse nation, with
many cultures and ethnicities. This is especially true among
young people. Minorities have been disproportionately incar-
cerated for many years. Although blacks comprise approxi-
mately 15% of the population, they account for 38% of youths
in public juvenile correctional facilities."' In 1982, the incar-
ceration rate in public juvenile correctional facilities was four
times greater for black male juveniles than for white males,
while black females were incarcerated at over twice the rate of
white females in similar public facilities.5 2 Addressing the dis-
proportionate rate of minority incarceration in the juvenile jus-
tice system may first require comprehensive social and
economic reforms, but this issue should hold center stage in
the future.
Gender
Researchers during the 1970s documented the long-stand-
ing differential treatment of girls by the juvenile justice sys-
tem."3 Their research indicated that girls were more likely to
be incarcerated for a less serious offense than their male coun-
terparts, and that they were often confined for longer periods
of time than boys who had committed serious offenses. Unfor-
tunately, despite some decline in the rates of female incarcera-
tion, the differential treatment of female juveniles continues to
be a problem. Girls are still being confined for less serious
offenses than are boys, and programs designed especially for
female offenders are rare. Juvenile justice professionals and
elected public officials need .to make this issue a top priority
and design programs that will reduce the rate of incarceration
among girls.
Public Opinion
The distorted picture the public has about the juvenile
crime problem is particularly troublesome. It is difficult to
51. See Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, & Guttman, The
Incarceration of Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELtNo. 173, 179 (1987).
52. Id. at 184-85.
53. See, e.g., Kratcoski, Differential Treatment of Delinquent Boys and Girls in
Juvenile Court, 53 CHILD WELFARE 16 (1972); Sarri, Juvenile Law: How it
Penalizes Females, in THE FEMALE OFFENDER 67 (L. Crites ed. 1976);
Schlossman & Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female. Juvenile
Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. ED. REV. 65 (1978); Chesney-Lind,
Judicial Paternalism and the Female Status Offender. Training Women to Know Their
Place, 23 CRIME & DELIN. 121 (1977).
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imagine how rational juvenile crime control policies can be
developed and maintained when most citizens are ill-informed
on the issue and elected officials blatantly exploit this. Every
effort must be made to inform and educate the public about the
nature and scope of the juvenile crime problem so that sound
decisions can be made. The experiences of the 1988 presiden-
tial campaign should serve as a stern reminder of the social fric-
tion surrounding correctional policy and the extent to which
ignorance and fear have been allowed to affect public debate."
The Federal Role
There is no escaping the need for federal leadership in
juvenile justice policy. In the future, federal administrators
should take the lead in acquainting state and local governments
with the most effective and innovative juvenile justice practices.
New energy should be focused on developing the non-institu-
tional alternatives called for in the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act of 1974 and its amendments. In
addition, federal leaders should be spearheading a national
effort to prevent crime, not merely punish the small proportion
of offenders who are actually caught and convicted. The U.S.
Congress declared in 1974 that it would provide the necessary
resources, leadership and coordination to "develop and imple-
ment effective methods of preventing and reducing juvenile
delinquency, including methods with a special focus on main-
taining and strengthening the family unit so that juveniles may
be retained in their homes." 5 5 Community-based prevention is
fundamental to alleviating the problems of delinquency and its
common antecedents: family disruption, school failure and
drug abuse. Now, as fifteen years ago, effective community-
based prevention should be a national priority.
CONCLUSION
A number of forward-thinking state and local governments
have shown that, given the availability of well-designed and
well-managed programs, many juvenile offenders can be main-
tained in the community without jeopardizing the public safety.
Yet, most of the nation has continued to believe that juvenile
crime is worsening and that an increasingly punitive and
expensive juvenile corrections system is the best solution to the
crime problem. This approach is wasteful at best and socially
54. See generally, e.g., Campaign Focus on Furloughs Prompts Review of
Programs, 19 CRIM. JusT. NEWSL. I (Dec. 1, 1988).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(b) (1988).
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destructive at worst. Juvenile justice policy must be redirected
during the 1990s toward a more effective and efficient use of
scarce resources. The 1980s proved to be a decade of stagna-
tion; the next ten years must be a decade of progress.
